

Does IT help?

Information Technology in Banking and Entrepreneurship

Toni Ahnert Sebastian Doerr Nicola Pierri Yannick Timmer

ECB, BIS, IMF, FRB

Finance and Productivity Conference, 5 May 2022

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IT revolution in Banking

Banks have massively invested in Information Technology (IT) since the late 90s

- *"We see ourselves as a technology company with a banking license"*
Michael Corbat (Citibank CEO)
- *"We are a technology company"*
Marianne Lake (JPMorgan Chase CFO)
- *"We want to be a tech company with a banking license"*
Ralph Hamers (ING CEO)

JPMorgan Chase & Co

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JPMorgan plots 'astonishing' \$12bn tech spend to beat fintechs

Big increase in investment will hurt profitability, raising fears for rival bank earnings in 2022

Literature (e.g. Rajan and Petersen 2002) discussed impact of IT on credit and borrowers, but direct evidence still incomplete

Why the focus on Startups/Entrepreneurship?

Startups are “opaque” (have not produced much hard info)

- financing sensitive to banks ability collection and use of information
- maybe IT diminishes incentives to collect soft info hurting startups?
- maybe IT maximise the use of scarce info helping opaque borrowers?

Also, startups:

- often rely on external finance / bank credit (Robb and Robinson 2014)
- are very important for job creation and productivity growth (Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda, 2013; Klenow and Li, 2020)

This paper

- Study banks' reliance on IT and entrepreneurship
- Construct US county-level exposure to bank IT adoption through historical geographical footprint
- Propose a simple model of bank lending and screening

Main Results (Model AND empirical analysis)

- Exposure to IT-intensive banks $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ Entrepreneurship \uparrow
 - use house prices to provide evidence for collateral lending channel (borrowing against housing wealth)
 - bank-level IV approach (landgrant colleges and banks' HQ) \Rightarrow SME credit of IT intense bank \uparrow responsive to house price
- IT-intensive banks $\uparrow \Rightarrow \downarrow$ role of borrower-lender distance

A simple model of IT in banking and entrepreneurship

A sketch of the model

Key elements

- Banks (high or low IT) randomly match with potential borrowers: firms (old or young)
- firms need funds to invest in a project
- project quality known only to the firm (**asymmetric information**)
- \Rightarrow need for screening: through *info acquisition* or *collateral*

Heterogeneity

- young firms are **opaque**: NO *info acquisition* screening
- high IT banks relatively better on collateral screening (e.g. better at assess collateral value and communicate with HQ—evidence on this later)

Equilibrium

- Young firms with enough collateral receive funds from high IT banks
- All banks lend to old firms by acquiring information about them
- Young firms of high quality with insufficient collateral are not funded

Key assumption: IT banks relatively better at screening with collateral


Why?

- easier to transmit info on collateral within the bank (Petersen and Rajan, 2002)
- IT improved real-estate related operations (Jud et al., 2002; Kummerow and Lun, 2005; Sawyer et al., 2005)

Perfect empirical test would be to:

- look at loans of different banks to startups
- test whether more IT savvy banks more likely to give collateralized loans (ideally controlling for borrower FEs)

As second best, we can conduct the test using loan-level data from large corporate lending (Dealscan)



Testable implications

- **Prediction 1:** Share of high IT banks $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ Share of lending to young firms \uparrow (higher share of entrepreneurs)
- **Prediction 2:** Collateral values $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ Share of lending to young firms \uparrow
- **Prediction 3:** Collateral values \uparrow & Share of high IT banks $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ Share of lending to young firms $\uparrow \uparrow$
- **Prediction 4:** Share of high IT banks $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ = “quality” of startups
- + extensions
- **Prediction 5:** high-IT banks increases the share of lending to young firms by less in recourse states than in non-recourse
- **Prediction 6:** role of distance is less important for high-IT banks
- We test each of these hypotheses


Taking the model to the data

Data on young firms

Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI)

- Detailed data on end-of-quarter employment at the county-two-digit industry-year level
- Breakdown by firm age brackets
- Define young firms or entrepreneurs as firms aged zero to one following Adelino, Ma & Robinson (2017) and aggregate the data to the county level
- In our baseline specification we scale the job creation of young firms by total employment in the same county-industry cell

Startup employment share



Survey data from Aberdeen (previously Harte Hanks)

- PCs/Employee in the US in 1999, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2016
- For 2016 we have the IT budget
- Used in many seminal papers on IT-adoption (non-financial)
 - e.g. Beaudry et al., 2010 JPE; Bloom et al., 2012 AER; Bresnahan et al., 2002 QJE
- Highly correlated with IT budget and adoption of new technologies (Cloud Computing) for later years, 65%

Measuring IT adoption

At the **bank level**, aggregate from branch-level regression (Pierri & Timmer 2020):

- Purge \widetilde{IT}_b from local demand factors, branch size, time trends

$$PCs/Emp_{i,t} = \widetilde{IT}_b + \theta_c + \theta_{type} + \theta_t + \gamma \cdot Emp + \epsilon_{i,t}$$


At the **county level**:

- Merge the \widetilde{IT}_b with with FDIC summary of deposits
- Geographic footprint of banks across counties (as of 1999)

$$IT_{county} = \sum_{b=1}^N \widetilde{IT}_b * \frac{No.Branches_{b,county}}{No.Branches_{county}}$$

- $No.Branches_{b,county}$ is the number of branches of bank b in the county
- $No.Branches_{county}$ is the total number of branches across all banks in the county
- IT_{county} is standardized with mean zero and standard deviation of one

Exposure to IT in banking



Prediction 1

Prediction 1: Share of high IT banks $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ Share of lending to young firms \uparrow (higher share of entrepreneurs)

We estimate the following county-sector level regression:

$$JobCreation_{county,s}^Y = \alpha + \beta_1 IT_{county} + \epsilon_{county,s} \quad (1)$$


- $JobCreation_{county,s}^Y$ is defined as the job creation by young firms in a county (c) in sector (s), scaled by total employment in the county-sector cell
 - The share is averaged across the years 2000 to 2006
- IT_{county} is the county exposure to IT banks
- S.e. are clustered at the county level, counties weighted by population
- Controls include: local industrial structure, local IT adoption by non-financial firms, education, income, density, total population, share of black population, population age, average unemployment rate

Prediction 1: Results


VARIABLES	(1) share 0-1	(2) share 0-1	(3) share 0-1	(4) share 0-1	(5) share 0-1
IT exposure	0.462*** (0.118)	0.405*** (0.100)	0.378*** (0.099)	0.380*** (0.100)	
IT exposure \times ext. fin. dep				0.714*** (0.185)	0.692*** (0.181)
Observations	25,779	25,779	25,779	25,779	25,779
R-squared	0.003	0.046	0.248	0.248	0.350
County Controls	-	✓	✓	✓	-
NAICS FE	-	-	✓	✓	✓
County FE	-	-	-	-	✓
Cluster	County	County	County	County	County

- One st. dv. \uparrow bank IT $\Rightarrow \uparrow \approx 0.4$ pp job creation of young firms
- Comparison: decline of entrepreneurship since 1990 ≈ 3 pp
- Impact stronger in industries with higher external finance dependence à la Rajan & Zingales

Prediction 1 - Binscatter



Same pattern if focus on changes over time



- Confirmed by regression model

Collateral Values

County-year panel to test **predictions 2 & 3**

Prediction 2: Collateral values $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ Lending to young firms \uparrow

- Increase in house prices raises home equity values of potential entrepreneurs
- Exploit heterogeneous house price growth across counties, $\Delta HP_{c,t}$

$$JobCreation_{c,s,t}^Y = \beta_1 \Delta HP_{c,t} + \epsilon_{c,s,t}$$

Prediction 3: Collateral values \uparrow & Share of high IT banks $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ Lending to young firms $\uparrow \uparrow$

- Effects of rising house prices stronger in more IT-exposed areas

$$JobCreation_{c,s,t}^Y = \beta_1 \Delta HP_{c,t} + \beta_2 \Delta IT_c + \beta_3 IT_c * \Delta HP_{c,t} + \epsilon_{c,s,t}$$

Results

VARIABLES	(1) share 0-1	(2) share 0-1	(3) share 0-1	(4) share 0-1	(5) share 0-1	(6) share 0-1	(7) share 0-1	(8) share 0-1
IT exposure	0.348*** (0.111)		0.341*** (0.110)					
Δ HPI		0.020** (0.010)	0.024** (0.010)	-0.024** (0.011)	-0.041*** (0.014)	-0.034*** (0.011)		
IT exposure \times Δ HPI				0.075*** (0.027)	0.064** (0.032)	0.071** (0.029)		
IT exposure \times Δ HPI \times Low SU							0.136*** (0.051)	
IT exposure \times Δ HPI \times Homeequity								0.175** (0.087)
Observations	195,220	214,327	194,535	192,402	168,836	168,836	192,097	192,097
R-squared	0.008	0.006	0.008	0.564	0.581	0.597	0.621	0.621
County \times NAICS FE	-	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	-	-
Year FE \times NAICS FE	-	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	✓
County \times Year FE	-	-	-	-	-	-	✓	✓
Cluster	County	County	County	County	County	County	County	County

- $\beta_1 > 0 \Rightarrow$ Prediction 2 (as in Adelino, Shoar, & Severino 2015)
- $\beta_3 > 0 \Rightarrow$ Prediction 3
- β_3 larger in industries where home equity is more used to start companies or average startup capital is low

IT in banking and Transition Rates

Prediction 4: Share of high IT banks $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ = “quality” of startups

- no direct info on startup survival or defaults
- but can look at “transition rates” = how much has the employment at startups created in a given year growth or shrunk?

$$transition_{county,s,t} = \frac{EmploymentAge2to3_{county,s,t+2} - EmploymentStartup_{county,s,t}}{EmploymentStartup_{county,s,t}}$$

We find no correlation between average transition rates and county-exposure to IT in banking: \Rightarrow more startups and not of worse quality

VARIABLES	(1) employment	(2) transition rate age 0-1 to 2-3 (average)	(3) employment
IT exposure	-0.000237 (0.000449)	-0.000332 (0.000410)	-0.000352 (0.000401)
Observations	23,729	23,729	23,729
R-squared	0.000	0.005	0.068
County Controls	-	✓	✓
NAICS FE	-	-	✓
Cluster	County	County	County

Bank-level results


Construct bank-county-year panel:

- bank-county-year CRA data for loans ≤ 1 mn USD (or ≤ 100 k USD)
- study how $\Delta \text{loans}_{b,c,t}$ respond to house prices, borrower-lender distance, and local income shocks
- ... as a function of bank-level IT

Findings:

- high IT banks' small business lending respond more to house prices rises \rightarrow Prediction 3
- low IT banks' respond less to local income shocks of counties farther away; high IT banks respond similarly to shocks in close and far counties \rightarrow Prediction 6

SME credit, Bank's IT, and House Prices



Prediction 6

IT adoption by banks could reduce the importance of distance

- Enables a more effective transmission of information from branch to HQ

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta loans_{b,c,t} = & \beta_1 \log(distance)_{b,c} + \beta_2 \Delta income\ p.c.c,t \\ & + \beta_3 \log(distance)_{b,c} \times \Delta income\ p.c.c,t \\ & + bank\ controls_{b,t-1} + \theta + \varepsilon_{b,c,t},\end{aligned}\tag{2}$$

if IT = low/high

- $\Delta loans_{b,c,t}$ log difference in total CRA small business loans by bank b to borrower county c in year t
- $\Delta income\ p.c.c,t$ is the county level growth in income
- IT is bank-level IT adoption
- $\log(distance)_{b,c}$ is the distance between bank HQ and the borrowing county

CRA lending – distance and income opportunities


VARIABLES	(1) low IT Δ loans	(2) high IT Δ loans	(3) Δ loans	(4) Δ loans
log(distance)	0.055*** (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.017*** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.003)
Δ income \times log(distance)	-0.009*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
IT			0.060*** (0.014)	
Δ income \times IT			-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)
IT \times log(distance)			-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)
Δ income \times log(distance) \times IT			0.003*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)
Observations	84,902	54,278	194,771	194,768
R-squared	0.234	0.286	0.127	0.150
Year FE	✓	-	-	-
-	-			
County \times Year	-	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓			
Bank FE	-	-	-	✓

- β_3 larger (in absolute value) for low IT banks \rightarrow Prediction 6

IV Approach

IT adoption could be correlated with unobservable bank-level confounding factors (e.g., management practise)

- we instrument bank-level IT with distance between BHC HQ and land-grant colleges (Pierri and Timmer 2020, He et al. 2021)
- colleges established in 19th century to provide technical education (and even today students mostly in technical subjects) \Rightarrow shifters of technical knowledge
- location partly due to historical accidents (Moretti 2004)
- LG presence in a county does not predict of BHC location
- \Rightarrow BHC HQ farther away from LG lead to lower IT adoption
- IV estimates confirm bank-level result



Conclusion

- Entrepreneurship has declined during the years of the IT revolution in finance (and other industries)
- This paper study connection between adoption of IT in banking and entrepreneurship
- A parsimonious model shows that IT in banking can spur entrepreneurship by making it easier to borrow against collateral—especially when collateral values increases
- Results are confirmed empirically using data on IT adoption of US banks

Results even more important nowadays as role of non-banks and FinTech in lending to SME increased since GFC (Gopal & Schnabl 2020)