

*Discussion of:*  
Do Larger Firms Exert More Market Power?  
Markups and Markdowns along the Size Distribution

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## Summary of the Paper

- Wage markdowns can account for measurement errors in computing output price markup using the production function approach.
- After corrections, findings indicate:
  - Decreasing firm markups with firm size.
  - Increasing wage markdowns with firm size.
- When controlling for markdowns, a positive correlation emerges between markups and size.

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- When controlling for markdowns, a positive correlation emerges between markups and size.
- **Insight:** Labor market power offers an alternative reason to labor-augmenting productivity on puzzling findings in Raval 2023.

# Main Equations

Cost minimization FOC for  $M_{it}$  +  
 $z_{it}$  exogenous

$$\mu_{it} = \theta_{it}^M \frac{P_{it} Q_{it}}{z_{it} M_{it}} \quad (1)$$

Equation (1) +  
Cost minimization FOC for  $L_{it}$  +  
Labor monopsony power

$$\gamma_{it} = \frac{\theta_{it}^L}{\theta_{it}^M} \frac{z_{it} M_{it}}{w_{it} L_{it}} \quad (2)$$

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Workers bargaining power  $> 0$

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**Bottom line:** Output elasticities for  $M$  and  $L$  must be estimated.

## Estimating Output Elasticities

$$q_{it} = f(K_{it}, L_{it}, M_{it}, \boldsymbol{\beta}) + \underbrace{h_{it}(\omega_{it-1}, \mathbf{T}_{it-1})}_{\omega_{it}} + \zeta_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

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### Estimation issues:

- From product to firm-level output quantity data  $\implies$  Aggregate price index
- Unobserved  $K$  and  $M$  input prices  $\implies$  Control function
- Controlling for unobserved productivity

## Scalar Unobservable for Vector Unobservable?

- Control function approach using energy and raw materials demand.

$$e_{it} = e_{it}(\omega_{it}, K_{it}, L_{it}, EX_{it}, NumProd_{it}, w_{it}) \quad (2)$$

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- $e_{it}$  is a component of  $M_{it}$ .
- From your main equations,  $M_{it}$  is a function of  $\mu_{it}$  and  $\gamma_{it}$ .
- Why shouldn't be also  $e_{it}$ ?

## Scalar Unobservable for Vector Unobservable?

- Assuming that the policy function for  $e_{it}$  is

$$e_{it} = e_{it}(\omega_{it}, K_{it}, L_{it}, EX_{it}, NumProd_{it}, w_{it}, \mu_{it}, \gamma_{it}) \quad (3)$$

- And assuming the following control function for productivity

$$\omega_{it} = g_{it}(e_{it}, K_{it}, L_{it}, EX_{it}, NumProd_{it}, w_{it}) \quad (4)$$

- Past and present markups and markdowns residual heterogeneity is introduced into the structural error term.
- This would invalidate the moment conditions.

## Conclusion

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- Demirer 2020 also has material demand conditionally independent of markups.
- He implicitly assumes compatible conduct, for example, Cournot or monopolistic competition.
- Can you make a similar case?