Understanding macro trends with CompNet:

The case for the ECB to “go micro”

CompNet Data provider Forum
Halle, 7 May 2019
## Overview

1. **Example #1: Understanding wage developments in the EA**
   - 1.1 Declining productivity-wage pass-through (work in progress)
   - 1.2 Flattening wage Phillips curve in the EA

2. **Example #2: Firms’ deleveraging after the crisis**

3. **Example #3: Trade (only if time!)

4. **Policy implications**
The productivity-wage link: joint with Elena Bobeica

Secular decline in the productivity-wage growth link

Macro picture: Pass-through of productivity to wage growth over time, large EA countries
Estimated with macro quarterly data for 1972-2018: rolling windows

Pass-through of productivity to wage growth, pooled sector data
Rolling window estimation

Sources: CompNet 6th vintage, full sample.
Notes: Countries included: BE, FI, FR, IT, NL, PT, ES. Period covered: 2004-2015. Coefficients from a fixed-effect regression at the country-sector level with clustered standard errors, controlling for labour market slack and year dummies.
What the literature says

• Possible reasons (behind substitution of labour for capital):
  – Globalization of trade and capital:
    • Increase of global value chain participation (OECD, 2018)
    • Fewer barriers to the mobility of capital across borders (Kramarz, 2016)
  – Rapid advance of technology:
    • Cheaper investment goods (Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2014)
    • Automation of tasks (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2016)
    • Increasing market shares of frontier firms (Andrews, Criscuolo and Gal, 2016; Schwellnus et al., 2018)
Give up the very long view but gain insights into:

1. Role of frontier firms (interacting with institutions and technology content of sector) in shaping aggregate PT

2. Changes in PT over the most recent period, particularly post-crisis relative to pre-crisis: For now, uncover new facts, coming soon, understand links

Data from 6th vintage of CompNet, all firms with employees.

- 7 EA countries (BE, FI, FR, IT, NL, PT, ES) over the period 2004-2015;
- 50-something sectors (2-digit) in each country-year; and different types of firms in each sector (productivity, size, mark-ups).
The impact of frontier firms on average PT

**Specification:** \( \Delta \text{real} W_{cst} = \alpha + \beta \Delta \text{real} \text{prod}_{cst} + \gamma \text{Slack}_{ct} + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{cst} \)

FE estimation: Within country-sector variation; errors clustered at the c-s level

Let Beta vary with the position of the firm on the TFP distribution of the sector

Estimated pass-through declines monotonically with firm’s TFP…

Estimated coefficient for different firms in the same sector, average of the period

…maybe because superstars are significantly more capital intensive than other firms in the sector

Premia of superstars relative to median firm in sector

Notes: Countries included: BE, FI, FR, IT, NL, PT, ES. Period 2004-2015. Coefficients from a fixed-effect regression at the country-sector level with clustered errors. Controlling for labour market slack and year dummies.
Focusing on the most recent period: the impact of the crisis (I)

We find three new facts regarding the PT over the most recent period: 1) in the post-crisis years, the PT has declined only in low TFP firms

PT dynamics in low TFP firms and rest within a given sector
Estimated coefficient for different firms within each sector, rolling windows

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: annual growth in median nominal wage of the sector</th>
<th>By TFP and period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Growth in real productivity (reference: low TFP firms in pre-crisis)</td>
<td>0.855***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth in real productivity* Dummy=1 if TFP&gt;20th pc</td>
<td>-0.405***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth in real productivity* Dummy=1 for post-crisis (low TFP firms)</td>
<td>-0.611***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth in real productivity* Dummy=1 for post-crisis (medium-high TFP firms)</td>
<td>0.386***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labour market slack</td>
<td>-0.0452**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.0171***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Countries included: BE, FI, FR, IT, NL, PT, ES. Period 2004-2015. Coefficients from a fixed-effect regression at the country-sector level with clustered errors. Controlling for labour market slack and year dummies. Low TFP firms belong to the bottom 20% of the sector distribution.

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15
Focusing on the most recent period: the impact of the crisis (II)

2) in the post-crisis years, the PT has declined only in more competitive markets

PT dynamics in sectors with high and low concentration of sales
Estimated coefficient for different sectors, rolling windows

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More concentrated sectors</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

![Graph showing PT dynamics in sectors with high and low concentration of sales](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: real wage growth in sector</th>
<th>(1) HHI</th>
<th>(2) C10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real productivity growth (reference=low C10 in pre-crisis)</td>
<td>0.626***</td>
<td>0.638***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real productivity growth*Dummy=1 if sector more concentrated</td>
<td>-0.353***</td>
<td>-0.346***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real productivity growth*Dummy=1 in post-crisis</td>
<td>-0.461***</td>
<td>-0.465***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real productivity growth*Dummy=1 in post-crisis *Dummy=1 if sector more concentrated</td>
<td>0.402***</td>
<td>0.411***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy=1 if sector is more concentrated</td>
<td>0.00701</td>
<td>0.0129**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour market slack</td>
<td>-0.101***</td>
<td>-0.0994***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.0146***</td>
<td>0.0139***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,414</td>
<td>2,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of clusters</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15

Notes: Countries included: BE, FI, FR, IT, NL, PT, ES. Period 2004-2015. Coefficients from a fixed-effect regression at the country-sector level with clustered errors. Controlling for labour market slack and year dummies. High concentrated are sectors with share of sales of top 10 firms in top quarter of country distribution.
3) Wage inequality has increased ONLY among low TFP firms, controlling for sector of activity

Cumulative growth of the bottom, median and top wages paid by low TFP firms
2009=1

Cumulative growth of the bottom, median and top wages paid by high TFP firms
2009=1

Notes: Low TFP firms refer to firms at the bottom tercile of the sector TFP distribution; high TFP firms are at the top tercile of the distribution.
How do we square it all?

• **Working hypothesis:**
  – In the post-crisis period, low productive firms in more competitive markets could survive only by reducing (some) wages.
  – Facilitated by:
    • The fact that they hire low-skilled labour
    • Large immigration flows
    • High unemployment since the crisis – lower bargaining power of workers
    • Labour market reforms

• **Work going forward:**
  – Use variation in prevalence and size of frontier firms across countries to study the correlation with the respective (long-term) drop in PT;
    • what is the interaction with technology content and regulatory framework of countries?
  – Explore wage setting and mark-ups of low productive firms in more and less competitive markets
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3. Example #3: Trade

4. Policy implications
In contrast to the EA, wage growth has started to pick up in CEE countries, amid economic upswing and labour market shortages

**Compensation per employee, non-EA CEE countries (2010Q4=1)**

**Compensation per employee, EA CEE countries (2010Q4=1)**

*Source: Eurostat.*

*Note: Last observation: 2017Q4.*
Overview of paper

1. Can wage developments in both regions be explained by the wage Phillips curve relationship? **YES**

\[ \Delta w_{i,t} = \beta_1 u_{gap_{i,t-1}} + \beta_2 \Pi_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \Delta PROD_{i,t(4qma)}[+ \beta_4 \Delta w.a. pop_{i,t}] + \tau_t + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_{i,t} \]

2. Are there fundamental differences in wage growth responsiveness in the CEE and euro area countries? **YES**

3. Is the role of other factors in wage Phillips curve estimates relevant (e.g. institutions, emigration, min. wage)? **YES in CEE**

4. Has the relationship changed in the post-crisis period? **YES**, flattening in the euro area

– Can more granular data from CompNet help us understanding why?
Macro data estimation of the Phillips curve, regional split

Wages became significantly less reactive to labour market slack in the post-2013 period in the euro area than in the CEE economies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: compensation per employee</th>
<th>CEE EU</th>
<th>Euro area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (_t-1)</td>
<td>0.759*** (0.106)</td>
<td>0.362* (0.204)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity (_t)</td>
<td>0.401*** (0.0828)</td>
<td>0.445*** (0.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U gap (_t-1)</td>
<td>-1.188*** (0.310)</td>
<td>-1.077** (0.450)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U gap (_t-1) * crisis</td>
<td>-0.310 (0.418)</td>
<td>-0.061 (0.226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U gap (_t-1) * post-crisis</td>
<td>0.705 (0.456)</td>
<td>0.851* (0.503)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Constant: 3.527** (1.354) | 1.396*** (0.465)
Observations: 743 | 1,292
R-squared: 0.556 | 0.490
Number of id: 11 | 19

**LM Slack coefficient in the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis period, 2 regions**

- **U gap \(_t-1\)**
- **Interaction crisis**
- **Interaction post-crisis**

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<th>Euro area</th>
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<td>0.851* (0.503)</td>
<td>1.077* (0.450)</td>
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Dependent variable: compensation per employee, annualized quarterly growth rate, 4-quarter moving averages. Productivity is also defined as annualized quarterly growth rate, 4-quarter moving averages. U gap = Unemployment rate - NAIRU. Inflation is included as 4-quarter moving averages. Sample is of quarterly frequency 2000Q1-2017Q4. Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. “Crisis” refers to the period between 2009 and 2013.

Here about data
The distribution of wages has changed, which could depress mean wage growth

Sources: CompNet 6th vintage, full sample.
Notes: Computed at the 2-digit industry level and aggregated to the country level by using sector weights. Unweighted average across countries in each of the two regions. Non-CEE EA countries are: BE, FI, FR, IT and PT. CEE countries are: HR, CZ, HU, LT, RO, and SI.
Is the change in wage distribution related to the flattening of the curve?

Sort of diff-in-diff exercise: explore if flattening significantly larger in sectors where inequality increased the most since the crisis

Elasticity of nominal wage growth to labour market slack, different sectors

Estimated coefficient

- **Innovation of paper**: estimate sector level Phillips curves using sector job flows to approximate sector slack

- **We split sectors in each country according to the relative increase in wage inequality since 2009**

- **Estimate Phillips curves for the CEE and non-EA CEE regions letting the coefficient vary for each sector split**

- We find that the flattening observed in the post-crisis period in EA countries is driven by sectors with large increase in inequality

Sources: CompNet 6th vintage, full sample.
Notes: Fixed effect regression of growth in nominal median sector wage against sector labour market slack, controlling for productivity growth and aggregate HICP. Standard errors clustered at the country-sector level.
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4. Policy implications
Debt sustainability of firms in NEA: joint with Francesco Chiacchio

Debt sustainability of the NFC sector depends ultimately on the repayment capacity of the indebted firms

- The question therefore is: **Which firms are indebted?**
- This study:
  - Goes micro and looks at the (static) distribution of debt and leverage, across different types of firms in available EU-9 countries - not here
  - Explores the time dynamics of leverage of different types of firms
  - Analyses factors correlated with leverage growth of **distressed firms**
    - Bank capitalisation (health of financial sector)
    - Quality of credit-related (and other) institutions
- We find that in countries with less capitalised banks and weaker credit-related institutions leverage growth of distressed firms has been relatively larger since the crisis
The macro picture

NFC sector indebtedness increased strongly during the pre-crisis and crisis periods; deleveraging thereafter

Debt-to-GDP, NFC sector (%)

Debt-to-financial assets, NFC sector (%)

Source: Eurostat, quarterly sector NA.
Note: Last observation: 2017Q4. Numbers refer only to the Non-Financial Corporation sector.
The good news is that the NFC sector is deleveraging… the bad news is that not all firms are doing so

• We consider two types of firms, within each 2-digit industry:
  – “Distressed firms”: Firms with 3 consecutive years of profits below interest payments, excluding high-growth firms;
  – “Healthy firms”: Rest of firms in the sector.

• Data sourced from CompNet (6th vintage)
  – 6 NEA countries: CZ, HR, PL, RO, DK and SE (data cover between 30 and 75% of population of firms with employees);
  – About 50 2-digit industries of the business sector;
Dynamics of median leverage of distressed firms (2007-15)

In EU-6 the leverage of distressed firms has remained at high levels

Median leverage by type of firm (2007=1)

In EU-3 distressed firms have deleveraged faster than the healthy ones

Median leverage by type of firm (2007=1)

Source: CompNet 6th vintage, full sample (20E sample for CZ and PL).
Note: Firms operating in all business sectors. Countries included are HR, CZ, and PL. 5 observations have been interpolated for HR and PL.

Source: CompNet 6th vintage, full sample.
Note: Balanced sample of countries; firms operating in all business sectors. The chart refers to Sweden and Denmark.

By sector
• Follow Schivardi, Sette, and Tabellini (2017): “Credit misallocation during the European financial crisis” (in Italy)
  – They argue that low capitalised banks may have been particularly adverse to absorb losses during the recession
  – The result is that weaker banks were willing to keep lending to weak firms that otherwise would not have serviced their debt

• Hypotheses of this chapter:
  – Countries where banks were less capitalised lent relatively more to distressed firms during the crisis;
  – Weakness in other banks’ institutional features, like depth and coverage of credit information, also played a role.
Dependent variable: Annual leverage growth of different types of firms in a c,s,t

Control for: Credit demand; country, sector and year fixed effects

\[ \Delta \text{lev}_{icst} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(Z_{it} \ast \text{BankCapital}_{ct} \ast \text{crisis}) + \beta_2 X_{icts} + \beta_3 \Delta V A_{cst} + \beta_5 \text{Size}_{icst} + \gamma_c + \gamma_s + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{icts} + \beta_6(Z_{it} \ast \text{Institution} \ast \text{crisis}) \]

- crisis = 1 if year > 2008;
- \( Z = 1 \) if firms are distressed, and 0 if healthy;
- Bank capital adequacy ratio: TIER1 + TIER2 capital/risk-weighted assets (St. Louis Fed);
- Other institutions: DB indicator of “getting credit” (legal rights of creditors and borrowers and scope and coverage of credit information), World Bank.

Coefficient of main interest: if \( \beta_1 < 0 \), banks with lower capital adequacy lent more to distressed firms during the crisis relative to banks with higher capital adequacy ratios
Has leverage of distressed firms increased more in countries with relatively less capitalised banks in the period 2009-15?

- **YES!!**

- This is different from **pre-crisis period**, when more (less) capitalised banks lent more (less) to distressed firms:
  - There was credit expansion and no worries for solvency ratios

- Leverage growth on average across all countries is lower in distressed firms relative to healthy firms

These results are totally consistent with Schivardi et al (2017)

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Annual growth in leverage of firms</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distressed * Bank capital * crisis</td>
<td>-0.012*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distressed * Bank capital</td>
<td>0.013**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank capital * crisis</td>
<td>-0.012***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Capital</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distressed dummy</td>
<td>-0.133*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distressed * crisis</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm’s size</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth in sector real VA</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis dummy</td>
<td>0.129***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.081*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations based on CompNet 6th vintage, full sample (20e for CZ and PL) and St. Louis FED.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Extension of the baseline: countries with worse **credit-related institutions** lent more to distressed firms since 2009 - [here](#)
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<td>Flattening wage Phillips curve in the EA</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Example #2: Firms’ deleveraging after the crisis</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Example #3: Trade (only if time!)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Policy implications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The unprecedented drop in exports in 2009 was driven by the intensive margin of few firms

Macro picture: Aggregate export growth in selected euro area countries, 2001-2017
Annual growth rate

Decomposition of export growth by firm type, 2009
Contributions to annual growth rate

Sources: Eurostat.
Notes: Annual nominal growth of exports of goods, %.
Coverage of exports in CompNet

Sources: CompNet, 4th and 5th vintage.
Notes: Continuing exporters have exported for 3 consecutive years; new exporters did not export in the previous year; switch exporters are in-out of international markets.
The importance of few firms to understand aggregate trade developments

More generally, few firms - the top exporters - explain the bulk of aggregate export growth in most EU countries

Concentration of exports in top 5 or 10 exporters, EU countries
Share of total exports

Correlation of export growth of top 10 exporters and aggregate export growth
Annual growth rate

Correlation of 0.64

Sources: CompNet, 4th and 5th vintage, and Eurostat.
Notes: Annual nominal growth of exports of goods, %.

Sources: CompNet, 4th and 5th vintage.
Notes: Share of total exports of top exporters, defined on the basis of their value of exports.
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4. Policy implications
We show 3 examples being analysed in DG-E where micro data can unravel key issues that macro analysis does not capture…

…and help better understand macro developments.

However, micro-founded analysis is still not widely used by policy institutions (although it is in the academia).

CompNet was created to fill this gap and, most importantly, to raise awareness among policy makers of the relevance of looking not only at the average but at the tails and other moments of the distribution.
THANKS FOR THE TIME AND ATTENTION!!!!
Reserve slides
The wage distribution has changed particularly in small firms

Cumulative growth of the bottom, median and top wages paid by small firms
2009=1

Cumulative growth of the bottom, median and top wages paid by large firms
2009=1

Included countries: BE, FI, FR, IT, SP, NL, PT

Sources: CompNet 6th vintage, full sample.
Notes: Small firms are firms in the lower third of the size distribution in the sector. Large firms are firms in the top tercile of the size distribution.
Increase in inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution concentrated in low TFP firms in most countries

Difference between 2006 and 2014 in wage dispersion, top and bottom of wage distribution: **Low TFP firms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Change ratio p50 to p10</th>
<th>Change ratio p90 to p50</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sources: CompNet 6th vintage, full sample.

Notes: Dispersion between the median and bottom wages in a given sector and TFP tercile computed as the ratio of the wage in p50 relative to p10 (same for dispersion between top and median wages). The chart shows the change between the log of the ratio in 2006 and the log in 2014, in each country after aggregating sectors using sector turnover shares. Low (high) TFP firms are in the bottom (top) third of the sector TFP distribution.
Data, definitions, country groupings and methodology

• Two types of data:
  – Macro data: Eurostat, quarterly data; All EU countries; 1Q 2001- 4Q 2017
  – Micro-aggregated data: CompNet; 13 EU countries; 56 2-digit industries; Info on NFC with employees; 2004-2015

• Definitions of labour market slack:
  • In the macro part it is measured by Headline UR-NAIRO (from AMECO)
  • In the micro part it is measured by sector JCR minus sector-specific JCR trend; same with JDR and with the net JCR (JCR-JDR). More here

• Country groupings:
  – EU CEE countries: all 11 CEE countries (both EA and non-EA) in the macro part; 6 in the micro one (HR, CZ, HU, LT, RO, SI)
  – EA countries: all non-CEE EA countries in the macro part and 7 in the micro one (BE, FI, FR, IT, NE, PT, SP – SE added in pooled EU regressions)

• Methodology: two-way fixed effects and more dynamic common correlated effects (DCCE) estimator
Mean markup dynamics by type of firm, services
2004=1

Premia of superstars relative to the median firm in the sector
Ratio, average 2006-2015

Sources: CompNet 6th vintage, full sample.
Notes: Countries included are BE, FI, FR, IT, and NL. Mark-ups estimated at the firm level using the De Loecker-Warzynski methodology.

Sources: CompNet 6th vintage, full sample.
Notes: Ratio of each characteristic of the superstars (top 1% TFP in the sector) to the median firm in the same sector.
Estimation of Phillips’ curves at the sector level using CompNet

Comparison of aggregate labour market slack with CompNet-based sector measures of slack
(annual growth rates)

We construct from sector job flows a sector-specific indicator of LM slack

- Compute the deviation of job creation (JC), job destruction (JD) and net JC rates to the country-sector specific trend
  - We capture whether JC in a country-sector-year is above its trend, i.e. the sector LM is tight
  - Or the JD is below its trend, i.e. there is LM slack
- The inverse of the (aggregated) Net JC measure of slack correlates well with the usual ones but we gain the adjustment margin and the granularity

Source: 6th vintage of CompNet, full sample.
Notes: UR gap is measured by headline UR minus NAIRU, provided by Eurostat and AMECO. JCR and JDR slack are measured as sector jcr (jdr) minus the sector-specific trend jcr (jdr). We show the inverse of net jcr. Countries included: BE, CZ, FI,HU, IT, LT, PT,RO, SP, SE.
Which firms are indebted?

**Firms with volatile or persistently negative profits hold between 15% and half of NFC debt**

Financial debt share by type of firms (% of total)

**The leverage distribution of “distressed” firms is shifted to the right relative to that of healthy firms operating in the same sector**

Leverage distribution by type of firms (ratios)

Source: Own calculations based on BvD ORBIS data. Note: Average over 2004-2015, but coverage varies substantially and it is poor in several countries. We only included country/years with at least 70% of all firms, dropping 8, 1, 9, 5, 5, 1 years for BG, CZ, DK, HU, PL, and SE respectively.

## Descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Banks capital adequacy ratio (%)</th>
<th>Share of distressed firms (%)</th>
<th>Healthy firms (%)</th>
<th>Distressed firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEA CEE average</td>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEA CEE average</td>
<td>2009-2015</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA CEE average</td>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA CEE average</td>
<td>2009-2015</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other NEA</td>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other NEA</td>
<td>2009-2015</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations based on CompNet 6th vintage, full sample (20e for CZ and PL) and St. Louis FED.

Note: Banks' capital adequacy ratio is the sum of TIER 1 and TIER 2 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets. Distressed firms refers to the average of (i) firms with 3+ years of negative profits and not fast growing; and (ii) firms with positive profits, with an interest coverage ratio > 1 for 3+ years.
### NEA: ORBIS coverage vs. population and share of employment by size class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country \ Size Classes</th>
<th>All firms</th>
<th>1 - 9 Employees</th>
<th>10 - 19 Employees</th>
<th>20 - 49 Employees</th>
<th>50 - 249 Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>22.2% (31.6%)</td>
<td>11.0% (10.4%)</td>
<td>15.1% (13.7%)</td>
<td>24.0% (22.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>21.8% (31.4%)</td>
<td>10.2% (9.2%)</td>
<td>12.7% (10.3%)</td>
<td>23.0% (18.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>15.7% (32.9%)</td>
<td>6.6% (7.5%)</td>
<td>11.0% (10.7%)</td>
<td>25.4% (19.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>6.1% (21.2%)</td>
<td>5.6% (9.6%)</td>
<td>13.2% (13.5%)</td>
<td>35.1% (20.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>14.0% (36.4%)</td>
<td>8.8% (8.9%)</td>
<td>13.0% (9.7%)</td>
<td>26.0% (16.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>2.7% (38.0%)</td>
<td>1.5% (5.7%)</td>
<td>17.0% (8.5%)</td>
<td>40.9% (18.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.1% (23.5%)</td>
<td>0.1% (9.8%)</td>
<td>1.1% (13.4%)</td>
<td>21.7% (21.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>12.6% (25.9%)</td>
<td>7.6% (9.5%)</td>
<td>11.0% (12.2%)</td>
<td>18.8% (17.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.7% (17.4%)</td>
<td>0.8% (8.4%)</td>
<td>3.3% (11.1%)</td>
<td>20.0% (16.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BvD ORBIS and Eurostat (SBS).
Note: The second column contains the coverage compared to Eurostat (SBS). Figures conditional on having information on profits and debt. For each cell from the third column onwards, numbers refer to the representativeness of the single size class in the ORBIS sample, while numbers in parenthesis report the Eurostat counterpart. Coverage is measured in 2012. Size class 1 refers to firms with less than 10 employees, size class 2 from 10 to 19, size class 3 from 20 to 49, size class 4 from 50 to 250, and size class 5 more than 250.
Dynamics of median leverage of non-viable firms driven by services

Median leverage by type of firm - Manufacturing (2007=1)

Median leverage by type of firm – Business Services (2007=1)

Source: CompNet 6th vintage, full sample (20E sample for CZ and PL).
Note: Firms operating in all business sectors. Includes: HR, LT, PL, SI, SE. 2 years are interpolated for PL and SI, and 1 for HR and LT (only for healthy firms in the latter case.)
## Extended regression: the impact of credit-related institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>DB getting credit</td>
<td>DB strength of leg. rights</td>
<td>DB depth credit information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distressed * Bank capital * crisis</td>
<td>-0.012*</td>
<td>-0.033**</td>
<td>-0.012*</td>
<td>-0.042**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distressed * Bank capital</td>
<td>0.013**</td>
<td>0.036**</td>
<td>0.022**</td>
<td>0.045**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank capital * crisis</td>
<td>-0.012***</td>
<td>-0.030***</td>
<td>-0.012***</td>
<td>-0.039***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Capital</td>
<td>0.100***</td>
<td>0.026***</td>
<td>0.015***</td>
<td>0.034***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distressed dummy</td>
<td>-0.133*</td>
<td>-0.718**</td>
<td>-0.722**</td>
<td>-0.668**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distressed * crisis</td>
<td>0.120+</td>
<td>0.699**</td>
<td>0.700**</td>
<td>0.648**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm's size</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth in sector real VA</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis dummy</td>
<td>0.129***</td>
<td>0.463***</td>
<td>0.345***</td>
<td>0.545***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB getting credit * Bank capital * crisis</td>
<td>-0.006**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB getting credit * Bank capital</td>
<td>0.005**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB getting credit * crisis</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB getting credit</td>
<td>0.003***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB strength of leg. rights * Bank capital * crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.075**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB strength of leg. rights * Bank capital</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.073**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB strength of leg. rights * crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.019***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB strength of leg. rights</td>
<td>0.038***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB depth credit information * Bank capital * crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.063**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB depth credit information * Bank capital</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.058**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB depth credit information * crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.028***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB depth credit information</td>
<td>0.040***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.081*</td>
<td>-0.463***</td>
<td>-0.370***</td>
<td>-0.487***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,360</td>
<td>2,153</td>
<td>2,153</td>
<td>2,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations based on CompNet 6th vintage, full sample (20e for CZ and PL), St. Louis FED, and World Bank.

Note: Bank capital measures bank capital adequacy ratio, the sum of TIER 1 and TIER 2 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets. DB stands for Doing Business.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15.