

# Indicators of concentration and competition based on CompNet and Orbis: a pilot study

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Economic and Financial Affairs



### Outline

- Objectives and motivation
- Analysing competition trends: a "market monitoring" of EU Member States
- Orbis: advantages and limitations
- The pilot study
- Coverage in Orbis vs. SBS
- Concentration: Orbis vs. CompNet
- Next steps





## **Objectives and Motivation**

- Increasing market power has been documented in a number of recent works
  - e.g. De Loecker & Eeckhout (2018), IMF (2019), OECD (2019)...
- There are differences across countries which require country-level analysis
- The balance between competition and market performance
  - Monitoring market performance for surveillance purposes means coupling regulation indicators with outcome (competition, efficiency) indicators
- Different competition and concentration indicators might provide (partly) conflicting conclusions: need for robustness





# **Objectives and Motivation**

- *CompNet already provides a set of indicators...* 
  - Mark-ups, concentration measures, profit margins
- ... However, not all EU Member States are covered...
  - But coverage has already improved with the 6<sup>th</sup> vintage
- ... And this one can serve as a validation exercise
  - For our estimations, but also to identify sources of possible deviations in the estimates from different sources





# Analysing competition trends in the EU

- The EU's surveillance and monitoring cycle
  - Analysis at the basis of the Country Reports
  - Results of the Country Reports as a basis for Country-Specific Recommendations
- Preparing a "Market monitoring exercise" with a scoreboard of micro-based competition and performance indicators





# Analysing competition trends in the EU

- Which measures of competition?
  - Concentration measures: HHI, C4/C8, P9(...)
  - Mark-ups
- ... But increasing market power is not necessarily equal to decreasing competition or worse market performance
  - Competition can increase due to a fall in entry barriers (HHI, mark-ups fall) or more aggressive behavior (HHI ↑; mark-ups ↓ or ↑ depending on reallocation)
  - => Profit elasticity (Boone et al. 2008); Allocative efficiency





# Some (well-known) issues

- Orbis limitations
  - Coverage is not good among smallest (<10E) firms
  - Quality of coverage is heterogeneous across countries
  - Coverage improving over the years -> affecting the indicators' trends
- Firms compete on products rather than sectors
- Ownership issues



# The pilot study

- Countries covered: IT, SK, CZ, DE, FR, NL
- NACE sectors C-N at 2-, 3-, and 4-digit level
  - Narrowly-defined sectors vs data availability
- *Time coverage: 2010(\*)-2017*
- Currently still work in progress (presentation of the pilot: June 13<sup>th</sup>)




# **Coverage in Orbis vs. SBS**

• Italy

Coverage, turnover by size class

Average firm size by size class



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


# **Coverage in Orbis vs. SBS**

Slovakia

#### Coverage, turnover by size class

#### Average firm size by size class





# **Concentration: Orbis vs. CompNet**


- Some preliminary comparison between the two datasets show:
  - Quite good correlation overall (0.7-0.8, depending on the country)
  - Inconsistencies in sectors where coverage is bad or predominance of SMEs
  - Over time, the estimates appear to become more consistent (correlation increases)






## **Concentration: Orbis vs. CompNet**

• Italy





### **Concentration: Orbis vs. CompNet**






# **Profit elasticity vs. concentration**

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• Our (preliminary) estimation of the Boone indicator confim that it is negatively related to concentration, but the instances where this correlation is positive deserve further analysis (pro-competitive concentration or estimation issues?)

• The result is confirmed at higher disaggregation

#### Slovakia





### **Next steps**

- Investigating the sources of inconsistencies
- Extending the pilot study to all EU-28
- Mark-ups estimations
- Relating the estimated indicators with regulation indicators (PMR, DBI,...), Competition Policy decisions and trade indicators
- Investigating the effect of competition on investment and innovation





### **Additional slides**





# **Estimation of profit elasticity**

- Intuition: in a more competitive market, less efficient firms should be « punished » more in terms of profits, i.e. the elasticity of profits to firm efficiency should be higher
- *Profit elasticity is thus the beta of the regression:*

$$\widetilde{\pi}_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i \widetilde{e}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

- Efficiency proxied by marginal costs or productivity
- Both profits and efficiency normalised to their range

