Credit, Income and Inequality

Manthos Delis¹ Fulvia Fringuellotti² Steven Ongena³

¹ Montpellier Business School
² Federal Reserve Bank of New York
³ University of Zurich, Swiss Finance Institute, KU Leuven, CEPR

Conference on Sustainable development, firm performance and competitiveness policies in small open economies

June 22, 2020

The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.

In the last decades income inequality has increased in most OECD countries (OECD, 2015).

Rising income inequality poses serious concerns for

- economic mobility (Corak, 2013; Kearney and Levine, 2016; Chetty, Grusky, Hendren, Manduca, and Narank, 2017)
- social cohesion (Putnam, 2000; Stiglitz, 2012; Larsen, 2013)
- economic growth (Galor and Zeira, RES 1993; Alesina and Rodrick, QJE 1994; Galor and Moav, RES 1994; Persson and Tabellini, AER 1994)

This yielded a lively debate on the potential causes of this trend and the proper measures to tackle the problem. The role of credit availability is at the forefront.



Galor and Zeira, RES 1993)

Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2009)

We study the relation between credit, income and inequality from a micro perspective.

We aim to identify and quantify how banks' credit decisions (loan acceptance or rejection) affect individuals' income and its distribution

- endogeneity issue: income is a driver of bank credit decisions (loan origination or denial)
- micro data enable robust identification.

We use a unique dataset of business loan applications to a single large European bank headquartered in a highly developed country

- 61,863 loan applications during 2002-2016
- small/micro firms (located in the country of the bank) that are majority-owned by individuals who have an exclusive relationship with the bank
- we know the cutoff rule adopted by the bank, the credit score of the firm, and whether the loan is approved or denied
- we have information on the owner's income for at least five years before and after the loan application.

loan rejected loan approved

We exploit the cutoff rule as a source of exogenous variation in the credit decision

- the bank cutoff rule based on the applicant's credit score creates a sharp discontinuity in the decision to originate the loan
- regression discontinuity design (RDD)
- we compare future income of accepted and rejected applicants that are close to the cutoff.



access to credit has a positive and statistically significant effect on individuals' income

- a loan origination increases the recipient's income five years onward by more than 10% compared to denied applicants
- the positive effect of credit origination on income is driven by the use of the borrower funds to make investments and expand the business, and it is stronger
 - in low-income regions compared to high-income regions
 - during a crisis period compared to normal times
 - when a loan acceptance is more likely based on soft information held by the bank.

Graphical Evidence



Figure: The figure depicts applicants' $Income_{t+5}$ (y-axis) against the *Credit score* (x-axis). The points represent local sample means of the applicant's income for a set of disjoint bins of control and treatment units spanning the full sample. The continuous line is a fourth order polynomial fit used to approximate the conditional mean of applicants' income below and above the cutoff. The credit score is normalized to be around the cutoff value of 0... > .

Local linear regression (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, ECMA 2014)

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Treatment effect} &= \lim_{\varepsilon \downarrow 0} \mathbb{E} \left[\textit{Income}_{i,t+n} | \textit{Credit score}_{i,t} = \textit{Cutoff} + \varepsilon \right] \\ &- \lim_{\varepsilon \uparrow 0} \mathbb{E} \left[\textit{Income}_{i,t+n} | \textit{Credit score}_{i,t} = \textit{Cutoff} + \varepsilon \right] \end{aligned}$$

- the two expectations are estimated by fitting linear regression functions to the observations on either side of the cutoff
- a bandwidth is defined to consider only observations close enough to the cutoff (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, ECMA 2014)
- higher weights are assigned to observations closer to the cutoff (triangular kernel smoother)
- the probability density of the credit score and the formal test of Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2018) show that there is no statistical evidence of manipulation of the credit score around the cutoff.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Income t+1	Income t+3	Income t+5	Income t+1	Income t+3	Income t+5
Robust	0.0632***	0.0572***	0.113***	0.0649***	0.0564***	0.112***
	(0.0150)	(0.0159)	(0.0188)	(0.0150)	(0.0172)	(0.0194)
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	57,766	49,514	41,391	53,585	45,333	37,210
Eff. obs. left of cutoff	8,731	7,510	4,487	8,274	6,171	4,061
Eff. obs. right of cutoff	9,186	7,855	4,686	8,670	6,398	4,232
BW estimate	61.37	61.3	44.03	62.61	54.76	44.08
BW bias	98.59	97	79.73	97.82	88.67	79.28

Table: The table reports the results of the non-parametric RDD. Estimation method is the local linear regression with triangular kernel. For each specification, we report the bias-corrected RD estimates with robust variance estimator.

- Two-stage selection model: results are confirmed when we control for sample selection
- Bandwidth: results are robust to different bandwidth-selection methods
- Initial wealth: the inclusion of initial wealth in the control variables does not alter our findings.

Economic Channels

Panel A. Small vs large l	oans, new vs ol	d firms			
	Small loans (1)	Large loans (2)	New firms (3)	Old firms (4)	
Dependent variable	Income t+5	Income t+5	Income t+5	Income t+5	
Robust	0.105***	0.118***	0.167***	0.0623***	
	(0.0171)	(0.0216)	(0.0386)	(0.0162)	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Obs.	8,226	3,507	2,727	13,245	
Eff. obs. left of cutoff	1,499	403	662	2,015	
Eff. obs. right of cutoff	2,022	416	679	2,026	
BW estimate	14.69	8.67	10.07	14.55	
BW bias	16.52	10.11	12.81	17.39	
Panel B. Firm outcomes					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
	Corporate	Debt	ROA t+5	Firm	
Dependent variable	$purpose\ t{+}5$	repay t+5	NOA 175	growth t+5	
Robust	0.131***	0.048**	0.048**	0.035***	
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.0207)	(0.0118)	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Obs.	27,628	7,311	41,391	41,391	
Eff. obs. left of cutoff	5,211	1,361	4,815	4,927	
Eff. obs. right of cutoff	5,440	1,407	5,003	5,093	
BW estimate	20.6	13.24	61.27	67.91	
BW bias	22.46	15.72	95.16	< 🗇 107.18 🕨	1

11 / 16

	Income _t	Income t+5
Credit is granted		
Gini coefficient	0.224	0.200
Theil index	0.080	0.065
Credit is denied		
Gini coefficient	0.193	0.214
Theil index	0.058	0.073

Table: The table reports the Gini coefficients and the Theil indices at time t and time t + 5 for the samples of accepted and rejected applicants around the cutoff (credit score < |0.1|).

Income Inequality: Geographic Heterogeneity

		Low income			High income	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Income t+1	Income t+3	Income t+5	Income t+1	Income t+3	Income t+5
Robust	0.0642**	0.0710***	0.1203***	0.0605***	0.0597**	0.0926***
	(0.0279)	(0.0230)	(0.0380)	(0.0191)	(0.0182)	(0.0263)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	28,883	24,757	20,696	28,883	24,757	20,695
Eff. obs. left of cutoff	4,220	3,412	2,311	4,113	3,347	2,290
Eff. obs. right of cutoff	4,355	3,504	2,384	4,160	3,416	2,297
BW estimate	58.6	56.28	43.28	55.69	55.11	41.18
BW bias	94.3	88.25	75.61	92.5	88.26	72.16

Income Inequality: Heterogeneity during Crisis

	Cri	sis and post-cr	risis		Pre-crisis	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Income t+1	Income t+3	Income t+5	Income t+1	Income t+3	Income t+5
Robust	0.0610**	0.0700***	0.112***	0.0639***	0.0395*	0.104***
	(0.0249)	(0.0258)	(0.0229)	(0.0172)	(0.0207)	(0.0291)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	20,850	20,850	20,850	32,735	24,483	16,360
Eff. obs. left of cutoff	3,509	2,977	2,992	5,613	3,886	1,778
Eff. obs. right of cutoff	3,657	3,099	3,110	5,876	4,040	1,874
BW estimate	68.69	58.09	58.34	69.29	63.39	43.29
BW bias	109.9	87.97	103.87	106.17	108.54	72.05

- Using data from business loan applications to a single large European bank, we study the effect of access to credit on individuals' income and income inequality
- we document that access to credit has a positive effect on individuals' income
- the impact is stronger in low-income regions and during a crisis period (negative finance-inequality nexus)
- our findings suggest that credit provision to small businesses (having good investment opportunities) is pivotal to foster entrepreneurship and economic mobility.

Thank you for the attention



Figure: Income Inequality Against Credit on Aggregate

The graph depicts the Gini index in logs (y-axes) against the ratio of private credit to GDP (x-axis) for 150 countries over 1960-2015. Data on the Gini index are from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID); data on credit and GDP per capita are from the World Development Indicators.

Figure: Manipulation Test



Figure: Sensitivity analysis for the RDD



(日) (문) (문) (문) (문) (민) (이지) 3/13



Figure: Applicants' income and lending rate around the cutoff

	Obs.	Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Max.
Income	61,863	11.01	0.376	9.852	12.29
Income t-1	57,682	10.58	0.406	9.804	12.62
Income t+1	57,766	11.1	0.388	9.866	12.58
Income t+3	49,514	11.14	0.373	9.987	12.57
Income t+5	41,391	11.16	0.363	10.04	12.62
Granted	61,863	0.867	0.498	0	1
Credit score	61,863	0.103	1.205	-2.921	2.1
Education	61,863	2.975	1.018	0	5
Firm size	61,863	12.821	0.806	2.5	12.03
Firm leverage	61,863	0.207	0.0249	0.143	0.917
Firm age	61,863	14.2	14.87	0	182
Loan amount	61,863	2.323	0.845	0.679	7.48
Maturity	61,863	34.35	10.14	7	103
Wealth	61,863	12.14	0.556	8.564	14.05
Initial wealth	40,953	12.09	0.406	7.952	14.2
Working capital loan	61,863	1.925	0.714	0.679	5.825
ROA	61,863	0.094	0.16	-0.711	0.836
Firm growth	61,863	0.193	0.386	-1.938	6.484

Table: Summary statistics

◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆目▶ ◆目▶ ◆□▶ ◆□▶

$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$							
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		Income t $+1$	Income t $+3$	Income $t+5$	${\sf Income}\ t{+}1$	Income t $+3$	Income t+
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Granted	0.0512***	0.0730***	0.0699***	0.0536***	0.0754***	0.0718***
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.0062)	(0.0064)	(0.0069)	(0.0063)	(0.0066)	(0.0072)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Credit score	-0.0015	0.006	0.0120***	-0.0056	0.0027	0.0084*
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.0038)	(0.0039)	(0.0042)	(0.0039)	(0.0041)	(0.0044)
ncome t-1 0.0958*** 0.0653*** 0.0452** Education 0.0023 -0.0017 0.00045 Education 0.0023 -0.0017 0.00045 Firm size -0.0004 0.0023 -0.0017 0.0019 Firm size -0.0004 0.0022 (0.0024) Firm leverage 0.1872*** 0.2877*** 0.2435** Loan amount -0.0008 -0.0023 -0.0014 Maturity 0.00021 (0.0021) (0.0023) -0.0014 Constant 11.0740*** 11.1301*** 9.9753*** 10.3098*** 10.5980* Observations 57,766 49,514 41,391 53,585 45,333 37,210 Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.01 0.015 0.015 0.013	Granted × Credit score	-0.0013	-0.0122**	-0.0216***	0.0026	-0.0087	-0.0168**
Education (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0045) Education 0.0023 -0.0017 0.0004 Firm size -0.0004 (0.0017) (0.0019) Firm leverage (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0021) Good amount -0.0004 0.877*** 0.2435** Good amount -0.0008 -0.0023 -0.0014 Maturity 0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0023) -0.0014 Constant 11.0740*** 11.1301*** 9.9753*** 10.3098*** 10.5980* Observations 57,766 49,514 41,391 53,585 45,333 37,210 Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.01 0.015 0.015 0.013		(0.0052)	(0.0053)	(0.0057)	(0.0053)	(0.0056)	(0.0060)
Education 0.0023 -0.0017 0.0004 Firm size -0.0004 0.003 -0.0015 Firm leverage 0.1872*** 0.2877*** 0.2435** Loan amount -0.0004 0.0021 (0.0022) Maturity 0.0020 (0.0021) (0.0023) Constant 11.0740*** 11.1301*** 9.9753*** 10.3098*** Observations 57,766 49,514 41,391 53,585 45,333 37,210	Income t-1				0.0958***	0.0653***	0.0452***
Firm size (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0019) Firm size -0.0004 0.003 -0.0015 (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0024) Firm leverage 0.1872*** 0.2877*** 0.2435** (0.0672) (0.0745) (0.0778) (0.0024) -0.0008 -0.0023 -0.0014 (0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0233) -0.0014 (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0023) -0.0014 (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0023) -0.0012 Maturity 0.0004** 0.0001 0.0002 (0.0002) (0.0002) Constant 11.0740*** 11.1301*** 9.9753*** 10.3098** 10.5980* (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0517) (0.0535) (0.0558) Observations 57,766 49,514 41,391 53,585 45,333 37,210 Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.01 0.015 0.015 0.013					(0.0041)	(0.0043)	(0.0045)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Education				0.0023	-0.0017	0.0004
Firm leverage (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0024) 0.1872*** 0.2877*** 0.2435** 0.2435** Loan amount -0.0008 -0.0023 -0.0014 Maturity (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0078) Constant 11.0740*** 11.1301*** 9.9753*** 10.3098*** Observations 57,766 49,514 41,391 53,585 45,333 37,210 Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.01 0.015 0.015 0.013					(0.0016)	(0.0017)	(0.0019)
Firm leverage 0.1872*** 0.2877*** 0.2435** Loan amount -0.008 -0.0023 -0.0014 Maturity 0.0004** 0.00021 (0.0023) Constant 11.0740*** 11.1044*** 11.1301*** 9.9753*** 10.3098*** 10.5980* Observations 57,766 49,514 41,391 53,585 45,333 37,210 Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.01 0.015 0.015 0.013	Firm size				-0.0004	0.003	-0.0015
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$					(0.0021)	(0.0022)	(0.0024)
Loan amount -0.0008 -0.0023 -0.0014 Maturity 0.0004** 0.0001 0.0002 Maturity 0.0004** 0.0001 0.0002 Constant 11.0740*** 11.1301*** 9.9753*** 10.3098*** 10.5980* Constant (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.051) (0.0535) (0.0588 Observations 57,766 49,514 41,391 53,585 45,333 37,210 Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.01 0.015 0.015 0.013	Firm leverage				0.1872***	0.2877***	0.2435***
(0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0023) Maturity 0.0004** 0.0001 0.0002 Constant 11.0740*** 11.1044*** 11.1301*** 9.9753*** 10.3098*** 10.5980* Constant (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0517) (0.0535) (0.0558) Observations 57,766 49,514 41.391 53,585 45,333 37,210 Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.01 0.015 0.015 0.013	-				(0.0672)	(0.0745)	(0.0778)
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Loan amount				-0.0008	-0.0023	-0.0014
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) Constant 11.0740*** 11.1044*** 11.1301*** 9.9753*** 10.3098*** 10.5980* (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0517) (0.0535) (0.0558 Observations 57,766 49,514 41,391 53,585 45,333 37,210 Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.015 0.015 0.013					(0.0020)	(0.0021)	(0.0023)
Constant 11.0740*** 11.1044*** 11.1301*** 9.9753*** 10.3098*** 10.5980* (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0517) (0.0535) (0.0558) Observations 57,766 49,514 41,391 53,585 45,333 37,210 Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.01 0.015 0.015 0.013	Maturity				0.0004**	0.0001	0.0002
(0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0517) (0.0535) (0.0558) Dbservations 57,766 49,514 41,391 53,585 45,333 37,210 Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.015 0.015 0.013	,				(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Dbservations 57,766 49,514 41,391 53,585 45,333 37,210 Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.015 0.015 0.013	Constant	11.0740***	11.1044***	11.1301***	9.9753***	10.3098***	10.5980**
Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.015 0.015 0.013		(0.0045)	(0.0047)	(0.0051)	(0.0517)	(0.0535)	(0.0558)
5	Observations	57,766	49,514	41,391	53,585	45,333	37,210
Clustering Individual Individual Individual Individual Individua	Adjusted R-squared	0.004	0.01	0.01	0.015	0.015	0.013
	Clustering	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual

Table: Parametric RDD

◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆目▶ ◆目▶ ◆□▶ ◆□▶

Table: Controllin	g for	"initial"	wealth
-------------------	-------	-----------	--------

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Income t $+1$	Income t $+3$	Income t+5
Conventional	0.0646***	0.0491***	0.112***
	(0.0148)	(0.0171)	(0.0227)
Bias-corrected	0.0681***	0.0450***	0.121***
	(0.0148)	(0.0171)	(0.0227)
Robust	0.0681***	0.0450**	0.121***
	(0.0175)	(0.0202)	(0.0260)
Obs.	36,856	28,604	20,481
Eff. obs. left of cutoff	5,312	4,238	2,207
Eff. obs. right of cutoff	5,572	4,386	2,295
BW estimate	57.92	58.91	42.43
BW bias	91.65	94.75	74.35

		Second-stage results	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Income t+1	Income t+3	Income t+5
Granted	0.0533***	0.0761***	0.0795***
	(0.0179)	(0.0185)	(0.0188)
Credit score	-0.0021	-0.0011	-0.0051
	(0.0311)	(0.0350)	(0.0205)
Granted × Credit score	0.0184	0.0038	0.0087
	(0.0367)	(0.0401)	(0.0233)
Mills ratio	0.9150	0.9683	0.6129
	(1.3962)	(1.3121)	(0.8163)
Obs.	53,585	45,333	37,210
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustering	Individual	Individual	Individual
		First-stage results	
	Pr. application t	Pr. application t	Pr. application t
Income	0.0739***	0.0767***	0.0781***
	(0.0083)	(0.0083)	(0.0108)
Wealth	0.0580**	0.0625**	0.0642**
	(0.0270)	(0.0305)	(0.0316)
Education	0.0245***	0.0220***	0.0237**
	(0.0072)	(0.0079)	(0.0094)
Firm size	0.0014	0.0026*	0.0034**
	(0.0024)	(0.0015)	(0.0014)
Firm leverage	0.2870***	0.3022**	0.3147**
0	(0.0331)	(0.0610)	(0.1103)
Gender	0.0081***	0.0081***	0.0074***
	(0.0023)	(0.0028)	(0.0031)
Obs.	228,507	228,507	228,507
Clustering	Individual	Individual	Individual

Table: Controlling for sample selection in the parametric RDD

	See	cond-stage resu	ults
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Income t+1	Income t+3	Income t+5
Robust	0.0601***	0.0613***	0.106***
	(0.014)	(0.0163)	(0.0182)
Obs.	53,585	45,333	37,210
Eff. obs. left of cutoff	8,203	6,049	4,080
Eff. obs. right of cutoff	8,480	6,261	4,197
BW estimate	62.4	56.13	45.09
BW bias	96.25	87.24	79.11

Table: Controlling for sample selection in the non-parametric RDD

	Income _t	Income t+5
Panel A. Inequalit	y measures around	I the cutoff
Gini coefficient	0.207	0.226
Theil index	0.067	0.074
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	y measures for acc	epted vs. denied applicants
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	y measures for acc	cepted vs. denied applicants
Credit is granted	-	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	y measures for acc 0.224 0.080	epted vs. denied applicants 0.200 0.065
Credit is granted Gini coefficient	0.224	0.200
Credit is granted Gini coefficient Theil index	0.224	0.200

Notes: Panel A reports the Gini coefficient and the Theil index for individuals' income at time t and time t + 5 around the cutoff (credit score < |0.1|). Panel B compares the equivalent Gini coefficients and Theil indices for the samples of accepted and rejected applicants.

	(1) Income t+1	Residuals>0 (2) Income t+3	(3) Income t+5	(4) Income t+1	Residuals≤0 (5) Income t+3	(6) Income t+5
Robust	0.0764*** (0.0244)	0.0595** (0.0234)	0.135*** (0.0293)	0.0856*** (0.0319)	0.0391 (0.0318)	0.0695* (0.0378)
Obs.	30,998	27,016	23,136	26,768	22,498	18,255
Eff. obs. left of cutoff	4,649	3,927	2,549	3,748	3,375	2,373
Eff. obs. right of cutoff	4,937	4,118	2,720	4,549	3,373	2,556
BW estimate	56.13	54.27	47.11	54.2	52.29	41.28
BW bias	94.29	93.18	79.26	92.16	90.25	76.64

Table: Hard Information and Soft Information

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Income t $+1$	Income $t+3$	Income t+5	Income t $+1$	Income $t+3$	Income $t+5$
Granted	0.0534***	0.0751***	0.0713***	0.0536***	0.0754***	0.0718***
	(0.0063)	(0.0066)	(0.0072)	(0.0063)	(0.0066)	(0.0072)
Credit score	-0.0051	0.0029	0.0089**	-0.0056	0.0027	0.0084*
	(0.0038)	(0.0040)	(0.0044)	(0.0039)	(0.0041)	(0.0044)
Granted x Credit score	0.0021	-0.0089	-0.0172***	0.0025	-0.0087	-0.0168***
	(0.0052)	(0.0055)	(0.0059)	(0.0053)	(0.0056)	(0.0060)
Income t-1				0.0975***	0.0657***	0.0447***
				(0.0053)	(0.0056)	(0.0058)
Education				0.0023	-0.0017	0.0004
				(0.0016)	(0.0017)	(0.0019)
Firm size				-0.0004	0.003	-0.0015
				(0.0021)	(0.0022)	(0.0024)
Firm leverage				0.1872***	0.2877***	0.2435***
				(0.0672)	(0.0745)	(0.0778)
Loan amount				-0.0008	-0.0023	-0.0014
				(0.0020)	(0.0021)	(0.0023)
Maturity				0.0004**	0.0001	0.0002
				(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Constant	0.0429***	0.0297***	0.0209***	-0.002	-0.0004	0.0005
	(0.0029)	(0.0030)	(0.0032)	(0.0038)	(0.0039)	(0.0041)
Observations	53,585	45.333	37.210	53,585	45.333	37.210
Clustering	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual

Table: Including industry, loan type, and year fixed effects in the parametric RDD

・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・
・

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Income t+1	Income t+1	Income t+3	Income t+3	Income t+5	Income t+5
	0.0611***	0.0716***	0.0610***	0.0645***	0.103***	0.0956***
	(0.0127)	(0.0167)	(0.0131)	(0.0178)	(0.0159)	(0.0215)
Obs.	57,766	57,766	49,514	49,514	41,391	41,391
Eff. obs. left of cutoff	7,743	5,053	8,260	4,373	5,180	2,599
Eff. obs. right of cutoff	10,530	5,284	7,802	4,536	4,831	2,738

Table: Alternative bandwidth selection methods