

Good mine, bad mine: Natural resource heterogeneity and Dutch disease in Indonesia


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The natural resource curse



- Sachs and Warner (2001): Negative Correlation between Natural Resource Dependence and Economic Growth, also after inclusion of controls. The Resource curse is a “reasonably solid fact”.

Why? Dutch Disease?

- Natural Resource boom → Currency appreciates
- Manufacturing sector becomes less competitive
- If manufacturing is crucial & Market Failures occur
→ Economic growth decreases (Long run; “Dutch Disease”)
- Cross-country studies largely confirm negative effect on MF
(Sachs and Warner 2001, Harding and Venables 2016)

Why? Dutch Disease?

- Natural Resource boom → Currency appreciates
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→ Economic growth decreases (Long run; “Dutch Disease”)
- Cross-country studies largely confirm negative effect on MF
(Sachs and Warner 2001, Harding and Venables 2016)
- Identification concerns → Move to within-country studies
- Local resource boom → Wages ↑ → MF ↓ ($RER = eP^*/P$)
- Mostly US data and oil&gas
(Allcott & Keniston 2017, Michaels 2011)
- Find positive results on manufacturing!

Good Mine, Bad Mine

- Labour intensity of extraction may reconcile previous findings

Region A



Gold Price
Doubles



Region B



Roadmap

- First to address heterogeneity in natural resource extraction
- Set up a GE model: One country, multiple regions, 3 sectors
- Collect data on Indonesia
 - Mining and Oil&Gas intensity by district
 - Labor intensity of resource extraction by district
 - Census of manufacturing plants with 20+ employees

 - Mining = 4.54% of GDP and Oil&Gas = 4.55% in 2009
 - MF = 23% of GDP 1990-2009, 14% of output exported
 - Government tries to promote MF exports to stimulate growth
- Collect data on global commodity prices over time
(Price Increase + Local Resources = “Local Res. Boom”)

- *What is the effect of a natural resource boom on local manufacturing?*
 - Local goods producers
 - Traded goods producers

- *Does the local extraction technique (capital-intensive vs. labor-intensive) matter for this?*

Main Findings

Mining boom in capital-intensive mining district:

- MF wages unaffected
- MF employment rises



Mining boom in labour-intensive mining district:

- MF wages rise
 - MF employment falls, if traded goods producer
-
- Can put previous and future findings into perspective
 - No Long-term TFP effects on traded MF



Theory I: Within-country Model

Based on Matsuyama (1992) and Allcott and Keniston (2017):

- Single country, common currency
- Take a specific district:
 - Natural resource sector (NR) = tradable
 - Manufacturing sector (MF) = tradable
 - Service sector (S) = non-tradable
- p_{NR} and p_{MF} exogenous, p_S endogenous
- Labor is the only input and is (imperfectly) mobile across sectors and districts
- All sectors in the district pay the same wage


Theory II: Results

- $p_{NR} \uparrow \rightarrow$ NR increases wage to hire more workers (“Resource Movement Effect”)
- Magnitude depends on Labour Intensity of NR-sector and Labour Mobility across districts
- As long as workers participate in larger NR-profits or population increases:
 - Demand for services and MF-good \uparrow
 - \rightarrow Production & price of Service Sector \uparrow (“Spending Effect”)
- MF cannot benefit and reduces employment
- In practice: The less traded a MF plant’s products are, the less it suffers / the more it benefits

- Sample period: 1990-2009
- 282 districts in 26 provinces in 1990
- Unit of observation: Manufacturing plants with 20+ employees over time
- $\sim 400,000$ plant-years, i.e. $\sim 20,000$ plants per year
- Mining data from *Raw Materials Data* and *MinEx consulting*
- Oil and Gas Data from *Indonesia Oil and Gas Atlas*
- Natural Resource Price data from various sources
- Population data from *Minnesota Population Center* (MPC)
- Labor Force Survey Data from Statistics Indonesia


Data & Key Variables II

- District's mining intensity =
1990 Mineral Resources / Area
- At least 1 underground mine in district → Relatively Labor-intensive mining
- 40 mining districts in 21 provinces, of which 9 underground mining districts in 6 provinces
- Oil and Gas: no resources data → use district-specific production ~ 1990 (37 O&G districts in 14 provinces)
- Focus on mining due to revenue sharing scheme & Labor-Intensity
 - ~ 50% of mining revenues shared with producing district
 - <10% of oil and gas revenues shared with producing district



Minerals prices and Oil Price 1990-2010

Log Prices 1990-2010



Data & Key variables III

- District-specific Minerals Price
 - Example: 1990 mineral resources are 80% gold and 20% coal
 - → Weight of $p_{GOLD} = 0.8$
 - → Weight of $p_{COAL} = 0.2$
- Tradedness of manufacturing goods at plant-level:
 - 1. Exporters vs. Non-exporters
 - 2. Refine by industry-specific distance elasticity of trade, proxied by avg. shipment distance (Holmes and Stevens, 2014)
 - If non-exporter & industry average shipment distance below median → “Local Goods” Producer
 - If exporter or industry average shipment distance above median → “Traded Goods” Producer

Empirical specification

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta Y_{ijkt} = & \beta_1 [Mineral\ resources_k \times \Delta MPrice_{kt}] \\ & + \beta_2 [Mineral\ resources_k \times \Delta MPrice_{kt} \times UGMining_k] \\ & + \beta_3 [OilGas_k \times \Delta OilPrice_t] \\ & + \beta_4 Mineral\ resources_k + \beta_5 UGMining_k + \beta_6 OilGas_k \\ & + \mu_j \times \alpha_t + \epsilon_{ijkt}\end{aligned}$$

- $\mu_j \times \alpha_t = \text{Industry} \times \text{Year Fixed Effects}$
- = difference - in difference specification with time-varying treatment of different intensity
- β_1 measures the *relative* effect of a price shock in the district with average mineral resources

Results

Labor intensity by type of resource extraction

Dependent variable	log(# Mining and Oil&Gas Workers)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Total Mineral Resources 1990	0.39*** (0.086)	0.30*** (0.107)	0.40*** (0.098)	0.18* (0.092)
Total BOE Production ~1990	0.07*** (0.018)	0.05** (0.023)	0.07*** (0.021)	-0.01 (0.023)
Underground Mining		1.07** (0.505)		
100% Underground Mining			2.45*** (0.185)	1.96*** (0.236)
Underground & Open Pit Mining			-0.05 (0.566)	1.17* (0.691)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	1484	1484	1484	1484
adj. R^2	0.119	0.137	0.163	0.416

- Underground mining > Open-pit mining
- Mining > Oil&G Extraction

Migration

Dependent variable	$\Delta_5 \ln(\text{Population}_t)$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \mathbf{W}_1$ $\Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$	0.044** (0.021)	0.000 (0.035)		
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \mathbf{W}_1$ $\Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price}) \times \text{Underground Mining}$		0.060* (0.035)		
BOE Production $\sim 1990 \times \mathbf{W}_1$ $\Delta \ln(\text{Oil Price})$	-0.019 (0.037)	-0.019 (0.037)		
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \mathbf{W}_2$ $\Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$			-0.030 (0.018)	
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \mathbf{W}_2$ $\Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price}) \times \text{Underground Mining}$			0.082*** (0.027)	
BOE Production $\sim 1990 \times \mathbf{W}_2$ $\Delta \ln(\text{Oil Price})$			-0.018 (0.028)	
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta_5$ Minerals Price				0.000 (0.007)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta_5$ Minerals Price $\times \text{Underground Mining}$				0.012* (0.007)
BOE Production $\sim 1990 \times \Delta_5 \ln(\text{Oil Price})$				-0.004 (0.007)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	939	939	939	939
adj. R^2	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.040
Marginal Effect of Mining Boom for Underground Mining=1		0.061*** (0.018)	0.052** (0.025)	0.012*** (0.003)

Manufacturing Wages

Dependent variable	$\Delta \ln(\text{Average earnings per worker})$					
	All Plants	All Plants	Non-Exporters	Exporters	Producers of Local Goods	Producers of Traded Goods
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$	0.022 (0.020)	-0.012 (0.021)	0.019* (0.010)	-0.043 (0.028)	0.018* (0.011)	-0.042 (0.026)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$ $\times \text{Underground Mining}$		0.071*** (0.021)	0.093*** (0.011)	0.049* (0.028)	0.094*** (0.011)	0.047* (0.026)
BOE Production \sim 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Oil Price})$	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.003)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	343466	343466	224078	119250	140167	203249
adj. R^2	0.034	0.034	0.035	0.037	0.032	0.036
Marginal Effect of Mining Boom for Underground Mining=1		0.059*** (0.003)	0.112*** (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.112*** (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)

- Wages significantly increase during a labor-intensive mining boom
→ Evidence of Resource Movement effect

Manufacturing Employment

Dependent variable	$\Delta \ln(\# \text{ Employees})$					
	All Plants	All Plants	Non-Exporters	Exporters	Producers of Local Goods	Producers of Traded Goods
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$	0.020* (0.010)	0.035*** (0.010)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.048** (0.022)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.048** (0.022)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$ $\times \text{Underground Mining}$		-0.033*** (0.010)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.057** (0.022)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.056*** (0.022)
BOE Production \sim 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Oil Price})$	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	343751	343751	224235	119378	140261	203440
adj. R^2	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.017	0.015	0.017
Marginal Effect of Mining Boom for Underground Mining=1		0.003* (0.002)	0.015*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)

- Employment sign. increases during capital-intensive mining boom
- Traded MF employment sign. decreases during labor-intensive boom

Manufacturing Revenues, Sales & Prices

	All Plants	Producers of Local Goods	Producers of Traded Goods
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\Delta \ln(\text{Revenues})$			
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$	0.019 (0.018)	0.041 (0.037)	0.001 (0.024)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price}) \times \text{Underground Mining}$	0.067*** (0.018)	0.112*** (0.037)	0.010 (0.025)
BOE Production $\sim 1990 \times \Delta \ln(\text{Oil Price})$	0.003** (0.002)	0.004 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)
$\Delta \ln(\text{Number of Product Units sold})$			
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$	0.049 (0.045)	0.032 (0.036)	0.063 (0.053)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price}) \times \text{Underground Mining}$	-0.024 (0.047)	-0.025 (0.036)	-0.024 (0.058)
BOE Production $\sim 1990 \times \Delta \ln(\text{Oil Price})$	0.011 (0.016)	0.010 (0.008)	0.008 (0.026)
$\Delta \ln(\text{Revenues} / \text{Number of Product Units sold} = \text{Unit Price})$			
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$	-0.006 (0.043)	0.032 (0.047)	-0.039 (0.041)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price}) \times \text{Underground Mining}$	0.072 (0.045)	0.121** (0.047)	0.012 (0.048)
BOE Production $\sim 1990 \times \Delta \ln(\text{Oil Price})$	-0.016* (0.010)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.018 (0.020)

- Local Goods Producers can raise prices during labor-intensive boom

Dependent variable	$\Delta \ln(\text{TFP})$			$\Delta_5 \ln(\text{TFP})$
	All Plants	Producers of Local Goods	Producers of Traded Goods	Producers of Traded Goods
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$ \times Underground Mining	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	
BOE Production $\sim 1990 \times \Delta \ln(\text{Oil Price})$	-0.000 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \mathbf{W}_1 \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$				-0.001 (0.017)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \mathbf{W}_1 \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$ \times Underground Mining				0.021 (0.023)
BOE Production $\sim 1990 \times \mathbf{W}_1 \Delta \ln(\text{Oil Price})$				0.001 (0.004)
Observations	214787	90126	124605	62430
adj. R^2	0.088	0.104	0.087	0.101
Marginal Effect of Mining Boom for Underground Mining=1	0.004*** (0.000)	0.007*** (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.021 (0.015)

- No long-term negative TFP effect on traded goods producers

Results are robust to...

- Excluding one labor intensive district at a time
- Redefining Underground districts
- Redefining Mining Intensity
- Studying Coal only
- Foreign and Government Ownership of plants
- Mining booms of neighboring districts
- Mining booms of other districts in the same province
- Upstream linkage of plants

Conclusion I

- Do resource booms hurt the manufacturing sector?
→ Depends on labor intensity of extraction method and tradability of manufacturing!
- “Good mine”: Positive effect on all plants
- “Bad mine”: Negative effect on traded goods producers
- Oil and gas extraction: capital-intensive and limited revenue sharing → no effect
- Can reconcile findings in existing literature
- On aggregate positive effects
& no negative long-run TFP effects on Traded MF

Conclusion II

- Results are large in magnitude
- AK find that a doubling of oil price raises MF employment by 0.3%
- We find that a doubling of mineral prices raises MF employment by 8.8% if capital-intensive mining!
- e.g. Coal price has more than tripled, so MF sector appears to be hugely affected by mining booms
- \leftrightarrow Less offsetting factors in developing countries!?
(e.g. labor mobility across space and sectors)
- High volatility of MF over time \rightarrow lower investment and entry?

The end

Thank you for your Attention!

Additional Results

Dependent variable →

$\Delta \ln(\# \text{ Employees})$

	Baseline	Booms nearby	Booms in same province	Booms nearby, after 1999	Booms in same province, after 1999	Two-way clustering
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$	0.035*** (0.010)	0.034*** (0.011)	0.033*** (0.009)	0.032** (0.014)	0.032** (0.013)	0.035*** (0.003)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price}) \times \text{Underground Mining}$	-0.033*** (0.010)	-0.032*** (0.011)	-0.031*** (0.009)	-0.036*** (0.014)	-0.035*** (0.013)	-0.033*** (0.002)
BOE Production $\sim 1990 \times \Delta \ln(\text{Oil Price})$	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Neighbours' Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Neighbours' Minerals Price})$		0.005 (0.022)		0.003 (0.022)		
Neighbours' Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Neighbours' Minerals Price}) \times \text{Neighbours' Underground Mining}$		0.001 (0.024)		0.006 (0.024)		
Neighbours' BOE Production $\sim 1990 \times \Delta \ln(\text{Oil Price})$		-0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)		
OthersProv Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{OthersProv Minerals Price})$			0.003 (0.003)		0.002 (0.003)	
OthersProv BOE Production $\sim 1990 \times \Delta \ln(\text{Oil Price})$			-0.002 (0.001)		-0.001 (0.002)	
Observations	343,751	342,065	343,751	196,189	196,935	343,751
adj. R^2	0.016	0.015	0.016	0.004	0.004	0.016
Marginal effect of mining boom for underground mining=1	0.003* (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	0.003 (0.004)

Robustness Checks I

Dependent variable →	$\Delta \ln(\# \text{ Employees})$				
	Baseline	Resources 1980	No industry switchers	Ownership Controls	Upstream Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$	0.035*** (0.010)		0.037*** (0.011)	0.025*** (0.004)	0.026*** (0.010)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price}) \times \text{Underground Mining}$	-0.033*** (0.010)		-0.030*** (0.011)	-0.024*** (0.004)	-0.019** (0.010)
BOE Production $\sim 1990 \times \Delta \ln(\text{Oil Price})$	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Mineral Resources 1980 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$		0.066*** (0.009)			
Mineral Resources 1980 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price}) \times \text{Underground Mining}$		-0.064*** (0.009)			
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price}) \times \text{Foreign Ownership (t-1)}$				0.123** (0.056)	
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price}) \times \text{Foreign Ownership (t-1)} \times \text{Underground Mining}$				-0.015 (0.058)	
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price}) \times \text{Government Ownership (t-1)}$				-0.033 (0.027)	
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price}) \times \text{Government Ownership (t-1)} \times \text{Underground Mining}$				-0.052* (0.029)	
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price}) \times \text{Upstream share} > 50\text{pctl}$					0.019 (0.039)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price}) \times \text{Upstream share} > 50\text{pctl} \times \text{Underground Mining}$					-0.021 (0.038)
Observations	343,751	343,751	230,353	343,751	343,826
adj. R^2	0.016	0.016	0.014	0.016	0.009
Marginal effect of mining boom for underground mining=1	0.003* (0.002)	0.003* (0.001)	0.007*** (0.002)	see below	0.007*** (0.001)
Marginal effect of a capital-intensive boom on: Domestic private plant: 0.025*** (0.004) ; Foreign-owned plant: 0.148** (0.059) ; Government-owned plant: -0.008 (0.024)					
Marginal effect of a labour-intensive boom on: Domestic private plant: 0.001 (0.002) ; Foreign-owned plant: 0.109** (0.015) ; Government-owned plant: -0.084*** (0.014)					

Robustness Checks II

Dependent variable →	Δln(# Employees)					Δln(Earnings per worker)
	Baseline	Excluding Tin & Nickel	Same Mineral	After 1999 FE	AK2017 scaling	AK2017 scaling
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mineral Resources 1990 × Δln(Minerals Price)	0.035*** (0.010)	0.035*** (0.010)	0.034*** (0.010)	0.036*** (0.010)		
Mineral Resources 1990 × Δln(Minerals Price) × Underground Mining	-0.033*** (0.010)	-0.033*** (0.010)	-0.031*** (0.010)	-0.033*** (0.010)		
BOE Production ~1990 × Δln(Oil Price)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)		
Mineral Resources 1990 (AK2017) × Δln(Minerals Price)					0.088*** (0.024)	-0.029 (0.052)
Mineral Resources 1990 (AK2017) × Δln(Minerals Price) × Underground Mining					-0.082*** (0.024)	0.177*** (0.052)
BOE Production ~1990 (AK2017) × Δln(Oil Price)					-0.002 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.009)
Industry × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District × After 1999 FE	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Observations	343,751	342,274	319,591	343,750	343,751	343,466
adj. R^2	0.016	0.016	0.015	0.017	0.016	0.034
Marginal effect of mining boom for underground mining=1	0.003* (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.006* (0.004)	0.148*** (0.008)

Robustness Check III.1

Sample →	All Plants	Non-Exporters	Exporters	Local Goods Producers	Traded Goods Producers
Dependent Variable	$\Delta \ln(\text{Average earnings per worker})$				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$	-0.012 (0.021)	0.019* (0.010)	-0.043 (0.028)	0.018* (0.011)	-0.042 (0.026)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$ $\times 100\%$ Underground Mining	1.329*** (0.458)	2.846*** (0.537)	0.475 (0.631)	3.313*** (0.515)	0.357 (0.586)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$ \times Underground & Open-Pit Mining	0.070*** (0.021)	0.092*** (0.011)	0.048* (0.028)	0.093*** (0.011)	0.047* (0.026)
BOE Production $\sim 1990 \times \Delta \ln(\text{Oil Price})$	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.003)
Observations	343,466	224,078	119,250	140,167	203,249
adj. R^2	0.034	0.035	0.037	0.032	0.037
Marginal effect of mining boom in the average 100% underground mining district	0.023***	0.051***	0.008	0.059***	0.006
Marginal effect of mining boom in the average underground & open-pit mining district	0.108***	0.205***	0.010	0.206***	0.009

Robustness Check III.2

Sample →	All Plants	Non-Exporters	Exporters	Local Goods Producers	Traded Goods Producers
Dependent Variable	$\Delta \ln(\# \text{ Employees})$				
	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$	0.035*** (0.010)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.048** (0.022)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.048** (0.022)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$ $\times 100\%$ Underground Mining	-0.623*** (0.169)	0.241 (0.204)	-1.262*** (0.309)	0.472** (0.225)	-1.236*** (0.223)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$ \times Underground & open-pit Mining	-0.032*** (0.010)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.057** (0.022)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.056** (0.022)
BOE Production $\sim 1990 \times \Delta \ln(\text{Oil Price})$	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Observations	343,751	224,235	119,378	140,261	203,440
adj. R^2	0.016	0.016	0.017	0.015	0.017
Marginal effect of mining boom in the average 100% underground mining district	-0.010***	0.005	-0.022***	0.009**	-0.021***
Marginal effect of mining boom in the average underground & open-pit mining district	0.005*	0.028***	-0.015***	0.027***	-0.015***

Robustness check: Exclude UG districts one by one

Dependent variable	$\Delta \ln(\# \text{ Employees})$								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$	0.035*** (0.009)	0.035*** (0.009)	0.035*** (0.009)	0.035*** (0.009)	0.035*** (0.009)	0.035*** (0.009)	0.035*** (0.010)	0.035*** (0.009)	0.035*** (0.009)
Mineral Resources 1990 $\times \Delta \ln(\text{Minerals Price})$ $\times \text{Underground Mining}$	-0.033*** (0.009)	-0.033*** (0.009)	-0.033*** (0.009)	-0.032*** (0.009)	-0.033*** (0.009)	-0.033*** (0.009)	-0.095** (0.047)	-0.032*** (0.009)	-0.033*** (0.009)
Controls & Industry \times Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>N</i>	343684	332996	343735	343411	343306	343571	343663	343509	343727
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.016	0.015	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016

- Results not purely driven by one labor-intensive district